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PERSPECTIVE
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Current Status of Global Polio Eradication
In 1988, theWorld Health Assembly (WHA) passed a historic resolution to eradicate polio by
the year 2000, resulting in the creation of the largest public–private partnership for health—the
Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI).When GPEI was launched, wild polio virus (WPV)
was endemic in 125 countries and resulted annually in the paralysis of more than 350,000 peo-
ple, mainly children. By 2000, the number of endemic countries had been reduced to 20, with
the last WPV type 2 case occurring in 1999 [1]. Interruption of transmission of WPV types 1
and 3 proved more difficult,with the last WPV3 case occurring in November 2012; WPV1
cases are still endemic in Pakistan and Afghanistan, where a total of 19 were reported in 2016
as of July 12th [2].
The key tool of the GPEI has been the trivalent oral polio vaccine (tOPV), which induces
both humoral and mucosal immunity protecting against paralysis and gut infection, thereby
limiting transmission and inducing herd immunity. As the immune response to type 2 in
tOPV is dominant, monovalent vaccines containing types 1 or 3 and a bivalent 1+3 OPV
(bOPV) were developed and used in supplementary immunisation activities from 2005 and
2009, respectively. These vaccines played a significant role in achieving interruption of trans-
mission of types 1 and 3 in India, where poor immunogenicity of tOPV was a major factor in
their continued circulation, and helped in Nigeria and Pakistan also [3]. However, their use,
combined with low tOPV coverage, has led to low type 2 immunity in some populations, with
the attendant risk of emergence of circulating vaccine-derivedpolio virus type 2 (cVDPV2).
Throughmolecular techniques that had just become available, the phenomenon of cVDPVs
was first identified in 2000 when analysis of type 1 isolates from an outbreak in Hispaniola
showed them to be vaccine derived [4]. Subsequently, retrospective analysis of isolates from a
type 2 outbreak in Egypt from 1988 to 1993 confirmed its origin as Sabin virus [4]. Since then,
many cVDPV polio outbreaks have been identified, and, although they can occur with any of
the three vaccine strains, over 90% are due to type 2 [5]. Moreover, type 2 vaccine virus
accounts for 40% of sporadic vaccine-associated paralytic polio cases.With noWPV2 cases
since 1999, continued use of Sabin type 2 strain, with its associated risks, has become difficult
to justify.
The Polio Eradication and Endgame Strategic Plan 2013–2018
In 2013, the GPEI launched its new Endgame Plan following the declaration by theWHA
(May 2012) that ending polio was a “programmatic emergency for global public health” [6].
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The expectationwas WPV transmission would stop by end 2014 and new cVDPV outbreaks
would be interrupted within 120 days of confirmation of the index case. Although the former
has not been achieved, the removal of Nigeria from the list of polio-endemic countries in Sep-
tember 2015 was a major success. A second objective was replacement of tOPV with bOPV
(tOPV to bOPV switch) in the routine schedule to remove risks associated with continued use
of type 2 Sabin virus. However, loss of population immunity to type 2 runs the risk of emer-
gence of cVDPV2s as the Sabin virus washes out from the population. In addition, there are
longer-term risks of leakage of WPV2 from sites manufacturing the inactivated polio vaccine
(IPV) from wild-type strains despite adherence to all the bio-safety practices stipulated in the
WHOGlobal Action Plan version 3. Deliberate release is also a concern, as may have happened
in India, where a laboratoryWPV type 2 strain was detected in 2002 in children [3]. Long-term
immunodeficient excretors of vaccine-derivedpoliovirus present a further potential hazard.
Mitigating the Risks Associated with Removing Sabin Virus Type 2
from OPV
To mitigate these risks, a number of precautions have been put in place. First, the switch from
tOPV to bOPV was globally synchronised in all 155 OPV-using countries and took place in the
two weeks from April 16 to May 1, 2016. Second, a dose of IPV was recommended to be intro-
duced in all 126 countries exclusively using OPV six months before the switch. This would
have boosted humoral and mucosal immunity in previously OPV-immunised children and
would maintain some background humoral immunity to reduce the risk of paralytic disease in
the event of cVDPV2 emergence. Third, multiple campaigns with tOPV were conducted in the
run-up to the switch, especially in high-risk areas such as Nigeria and Pakistan, to reduce the
risk of development of new vaccine-derivedpolio virus (VDPV) 2 lineages and to interrupt any
undetected lineages already in circulation. In the accompanying paper [7], Isobel Blake and col-
leagues nicely illustrate the correlation between low population immunity to type 2 and the
risk of cVDPV2 cases in Nigeria and Pakistan; they also describe the encouraging increase in
type 2 immunity that resulted from the tOPV campaigns conducted in these countries prior to
the switch. Their immunity forecasts have provided confidence to theWHO Strategic Advisory
Group of Experts that the proposed withdrawal of OPV2 in April 2016 should go ahead.
Fourth, because VDPV circulation can remain silent for some time, the monitoring system cre-
ated for WPV eradication, namely acute flaccid paralysis surveillancewith virological screening
of all cases, has been supplemented with testing of sewage for polioviruses for the early detec-
tion of any type 2 polio virus before it causes paralytic cases [8]. Finally, because continued use
of IPV is likely in the post-eradication era, alternative polioviruses are being developed that are
more bio-safe thanWPV for manufacturing IPV, especially in developing country settings [9].
Despite all these precautions, WHO has nevertheless developed a type 2 outbreak response
protocol that relies on the judicious use of monovalent OPV type 2 (mOPV2) supplemented by
IPV [10].
Early Experience with the Switch
Despite the major logistical problems, the synchronised global tOPV to bOPV switch was suc-
cessfully completed on schedule and, as of July 2016, has been verified in almost all countries
[11]. Less successful was the introduction of IPV due to unanticipated vaccine shortages result-
ing from problems of rapid up-scaling of production in one enormous demand-step. Prioritisa-
tion of available supplies to countries most at risk of a cVDPV2 emergence was therefore
undertaken,while reserving some stock for outbreak response if needed [12]. By April 2016,
IPV had been introduced in all high-risk countries and some at lower risk, though supplies to
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the latter were unfortunately interrupted after introduction, and re-instatement of stock and
supply to the remaining countries is now expected in the 4th quarter of 2017. In India, giving
two fractional (1/5th) doses of IPV intradermally has eased the IPV vaccine shortage; this
approach was based on evidence that the immunogenicity of two intradermal fractional doses
at 6 and 14 weeks was similar to what is expected from one full dose at 14 weeks [13].
The value of enhanced environmental surveillancehas already been shown by the detection
of a cVDPV2 in sewage, in addition to a cVDPV2 case in Nigeria, and detection of a VDPV2
strain in sewage in India in the post-switch period.An immediate response with mOPV-2 cam-
paigns took place in Nigeria and with one fractional dose of IPV in India based on careful risk
assessment (Michel Zaffran,Director GPEI, personal communication). Furthermore, the iden-
tification in Nigeria of two children with acute flaccid paralysis (AFP) due toWPV1 between
May 29 and June 18, 2016 underlines the importance of sustaining high-quality surveillance as
part of the eradication efforts [14].
We are sailing in unchartered waters with many risks, but with all possible precautions in
place to mitigate these. Removal of Sabin type 2 from OPV was the first step towards global
OPV cessation; bOPV will be discontinued following certificationof eradication of all WPVs.
Until all risks of OPV cessation are understood and mitigated, continued IPV coverage will be
necessary.
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